Search
`
July 4, 2024

MRC First Read on Proposed Manual Changes

Reason for changes: Updates to reflect changes from FERC Order 1000, switch to two-year planning cycle and revised benefit/cost test for Market Efficiency projects.

Impact: Adds a new section (2.1.2) on Market Efficiency projects and modifies planning time horizons.

Manual 28: Operating Agreement Accounting

Reason for changes: Incorporating changes to lost opportunity cost compensation as approved by FERC in Docket ER13-1200.

Impact:

  • Lost opportunity costs will be limited to the lesser of a unit’s economic maximum or maximum facility output.
  • Revises section 7.2 to incorporate details regarding shortage pricing (non-synchronized reserve lost opportunity cost calculations).
  • Clarifies revisions to section 5 regarding exempting deviations during shortage conditions and associating interfaces to the East or West BOR regions.

Analysis – JP Morgan Settlement: A Verdict on Electric Markets?

By Rich Heidorn Jr.

Are RTO market rules too clumsy and complicated to prevent gaming and protect consumers?

That’s the question on the minds of many observers following federal regulators’ $410 million-dollar settlement with JPMorgan Chase last week.

The settlement between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corp. resulted from schemes that turned money-losing natural gas-fired generators in California and Michigan into profit centers.

It was the fourth major enforcement action over manipulation of the electric markets in the last two years, following earlier FERC cases against Deutsche Bank AG, Barclays PLC and Constellation Energy Group Inc. and a Justice Department antitrust settlement with Morgan Stanley and KeySpan.

Regulators said the JP Morgan settlement, which included a $285 million fine and disgorgement of $125 million in unjust profits, showed FERC has dramatically improved enforcement since Congress gave the agency tougher penalties in the wake of the Enron scandal.

But consumer advocates and other critics say regulators’ enforcement actions have neither provided sufficient deterrent nor made consumers and honest market participants whole. Moreover, some say regulators will never be able to catch up with clever traders looking to exploit the rules.

Traders Smarter than Regulators?

“You have to wonder whether bureaucrats constructing byzantine regulatory systems that attempt to create a market within a government-controlled sector ever ask themselves: Are we simply developing arbitrage opportunities for Wall Streeters twice as smart as we are?” asked CNBC columnists John Carney and Jeff Cox.

“FERC and the ISOs built a dumb system that rewarded a modicum of perfectly transparent gamesmanship,” wrote financial industry blogger Matt Levine. “JPMorgan gamed them in the obvious and perfectly transparent way,”

Tyson Slocum, director of Public Citizen’s Energy Program, said the repeated instances of market manipulation are an indictment of FERC’s philosophy of regulation through competitive markets. By replacing its review of individual wholesale electric tariffs with market-based rates, Slocum said, “FERC outsourced federal law enforcement to the mall cops of the industry, so-called Independent System Operators (ISOs), private organizations with internal voting structures dominated by power sellers and utilities.”

If FERC won’t return to the prior regulatory regime, Slocum said, “People representing the interests of household consumers must serve on the [RTO boards] and hold a majority of voting shares. The organizations should be subject to Freedom of Information Act requests, and all meetings must be held before the public.”

FERC found that JP Morgan used 12 bidding strategies to profit from uneconomic power plants, all designed to exploit market rules intended to make generators whole when market prices don’t cover operating costs. At times, JP Morgan was paid $999 per MWh when the market price was $12.

`Historic’ Settlement

FERC Commissioner Tony Clark said that last week’s “historic [settlement] … sends a strong signal that market manipulation is being taken seriously” while allowing immediate refunds to consumers “rather than after a long multi-year court proceeding.”

California ISO General Counsel Nancy Saracino said the fact that the scheme was uncovered by the ISO proves the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms created to ensure competitive markets result in just and reasonable prices.

FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff emphasized in an interview on CNBC that the $125 million JP Morgan scheme was “only about 1%” as large as the 2000-1 Enron scandal, which cost West Coast consumers an estimated $10 billion.

“Activities in organized, competitive wholesale electricity markets are subject to scrutiny by multiple parties. They are carefully monitored by the ISOs/RTOs themselves, by the respective market monitors and by the FERC,” PJM spokesman Ray Dotter said issued this statement. “Detecting and correcting uncompetitive behavior in the PJM region has been successful.”

PJM Market Monitor Joe Bowring rejected suggestions that the repeated instances of fraud by electric traders was an argument for a return to cost-of-service regulation.

“All markets have complex rules. Look at the financial markets,” he told RTO Insider in an interview yesterday.  There’s nothing uncompetitive or bureaucratic about it.”

“Competition has, in my view, been very effective in reducing prices,” he added. “But there will always be people trying to exploit the rules.”

No Deterrent

Critics said the JP Morgan case and its predecessors showed that regulators are unable or unwilling to provide real deterrence.

Blythe Masters, JP Morgan
Blythe Masters, JP Morgan

JP Morgan’s $285 million fine was little more than twice the profits FERC estimated the company made in the scheme and little more than a day’s worth of revenues for the banking giant, which generated nearly $94 billion in revenues and $21 billion in profits last year. The settlement also allowed the traders and executives involved to keep their jobs, including head of Global Commodities Blythe Masters, who gained notoriety for helping develop credit default swaps, a derivative that figured largely in the 2008 financial crisis. A JP Morgan spokesman confirmed to RTO Insider that the employees remain with the company.

“The incentive remains for outfits like JPMorgan to stretch the rules to the breaking point — if they get caught, the cost is tolerable; if not, the returns are fabulous,” wrote Los Angeles Times columnist Michael Hiltzik. “It will have no more deterrent effect on white-collar wrongdoing at JPMorgan or anywhere else than telling its traders they’ve got to take the Ferrari to work instead of the Lamborghini, though they can still take the Lambo to the beach house.”

Table1Public Citizen called on JP Morgan to fire Masters and on FERC to revoke the company’s market-based rates. “The most powerful sanction FERC can invoke is to no longer allow JP Morgan to engage in the charade of deregulated energy markets,” Slocum said.  In November, FERC announced it was suspending JP Morgan’s right to sell power at market-based rates for six months because it had lied to California and FERC staffers investigating the scheme.

Consumers Made Whole?

Others, including Massachusetts Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey, said they were not convinced the settlement would make consumers whole.

In a paper published in the Energy Law Journal in November, attorney Paul B. Mohler concluded that consumers are less likely to be made whole when rates are found to be unjust and unreasonable under market-based rates than under traditional cost-based regulation.

The disgorgement also doesn’t compensate generators whose legitimate bids were rejected by CAISO and MISO. And in the case of California, it resulted in the dispatch of 1950s and 1960s vintage steam boilers which are less efficient and produce more emissions than more modern plants.

Regulators Playing Catch-up

Still others say the case and those involving other large banks and utilities are proof that — more than a decade after the Enron scandal, and eight years since Congress gave FERC the power to levy heavier fines — regulators are powerless to stop gaming of market rules.

JP Morgan’s scheme ran for more than two years between September 2010 and November 2012. The company’s traders gamed CAISO’s software, alternating high bids and low bids in a way that took advantage of the ISO’s make whole rules but maximized the company’s revenues. MISO, which can manually reject bids it considered suspicious, caught the scam more quickly. While FERC estimates JP Morgan made $124 million in unjust profits in California, the agency estimated only $1 million in improper payments in MISO.

“ISO market overseers seemed always to be behind the curve,” said Hiltzik. “The ISO had to submit new market rates and regulations for FERC approval five times … in its effort to wipe out Morgan’s scheming.”

JP Morgan thought so little of the risk of getting caught that, remarkably, 10 of the 12 schemes identified by FERC were launched after regulators began investigating the company.

“The record thus far indicates that manipulative schemes can go on for months, even years, before they’re uncovered by regulators,” said Hiltzik. “When will we finally learn about the ones that may be taking place today?”

The Enron scandal stopped many states from transitioning to competition from traditional ratemaking. The criticisms raised by the recent cases aren’t yet widespread enough to cause Congress to turn back the clock on competitive  markets. But if traders continue to see gaming the rules as a path to easy profits, RTOs won’t be able to take public support for granted.

PJM Urges Action on Simple Stability Fixes to RTEP

Constraints that can be quickly and cheaply resolved would be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) under a proposal given first reading at the Markets and Reliability Committee meeting Thursday.

PJM will ask MRC at its next meeting to endorse Tariff revisions allowing the RTO to add “easily resolved constraints” to the RTEP.

Before posting the planning parameters for each Base Residual Auction, PJM staff would be required to identify Locational Deliverability Areas in which the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit is less than 1.15 times the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective. Upgrades that raise the ratio above 115% would be added to the RTEP if they:

  • Cost less than $5 million;
  • Can be completed within 36 months or prior to June 1 of the Delivery Year; and
  • Does not duplicate customer-funded upgrades already in the transmission queue (e.g., one whose cost is assigned to an interconnection customer).

The proposal was approved easily in a vote by the Capacity Senior Task Force.

Triennial Cost of New Entry (CONE) Review

MRC members heard first reading on a problem statement to review potential changes to the Cost of New Entry (CONE) triennial review process. CONE values are used in PJM’s Reliability Price Model (RPM) to obtain capacity resources.

Reason for problem statement: PJM and members agreed to explore changes in the review process in a settlement approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in January (Docket No. ER12-513).

Impact of problem statement:  The inquiry will assess the use of the Handy-Whitman Index of public utility construction costs for adjusting CONE and other potential changes.

PJM is required to file Tariff changes with FERC in time for the 2014 triennial review or a status report if stakeholders are unable to reach consensus on changes.

PJM, NYISO Tout New Option to Improve Power Scheduling

PJM members will be asked tomorrow to approve a new scheduling option for transactions into the New York ISO to reduce uneconomic power flows.

Under the current system, PJM’s Stan Williams told the Markets and Reliability Committee Thursday, power often flows from PJM into New York even when PJM’s prices are higher.

To improve the alignment of energy scheduling with interface prices, PJM and NYISO are proposing creation of an additional product that would allow participants to submit “price differential” bids that would clear when prices in New York exceed those in PJM above a threshold set by the bidder.

The Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS) proposal will be brought to a vote at the next MRC meeting if it is approved at tomorrow’s Market Implementation Committee meeting.

PJM says the new product should increase forward price transparency and price convergence between PJM and NYISO.

A cost benefit analysis found that the change would have reduced total production costs in the two RTOs by as much as $26 million in 2012. PJM officials said they had not calculated how much the savings would have been reduced by generator make whole payments resulting from the change.

The biggest opportunities for savings will come when the price differential between the two RTOs is relatively low. Analysis showed prices could be reduced in about half the hours when the price difference is $5/MWh but only 13% of the hours when the difference is $15.

CTS Interface bids would be scheduled based on the projected price difference between PJM and NYISO at the interface. It would use PJM’s Intermediate Term Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (IT SCED) application, which has a two hour look-ahead capability.

The application correctly predicted prices about 60% of the time when the price differential is $5 or less. Williams acknowledged the tool was much less reliable when the price differential is higher. Williams said PJM plans to begin posting the forecasts publicly next spring and is attempting to improve its accuracy.

Bob O’Connell, vice president and compliance manager for J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., said members shouldn’t vote on the proposal until they have evaluated the risks of relying on the forecasting tool.

He also said the changes could increase balancing congestion, which would penalize Financial Transmission Rights holders. “FTR holders get no benefit from CTS,” he said.

Williams said the changes shouldn’t hurt FTR holders and should reduce price volatility.

CTS Interface Bids would have as many as four bid curves and up to 11 $/MW pairs. The option would be in addition to current hourly evaluations of traditional wheel-through transactions and intra-hour evaluations of traditional LMP bids and offers.

Credit requirements on the new scheduling option would be based on the higher of the 97th percentile historical (prior year) hourly price for the node or the 15-minute IT SCED price forecast for the node.

The issue has been under discussion with NYISO since November 2012. The new scheduling product would require approval of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Maryland County to Challenge PEPCO Rate Hike

Isiah Leggett, chief executive of Montgomery County, MD, said last week the county will appeal the Maryland Public Service Commission’s decision awarding Potomac Electric Power Co. (Pepco) a $28 million increase in distribution rates and a $24 million surcharge to accelerate the hardening of feeder lines.

Leggett said that the PSC’s decision to approve the surcharge was “premature.”

“I believe that Pepco has made improvements in their communications, infrastructure, and emergency response systems since last summer’s ‘Derecho’ storm. However, just how improved these changes are have not yet been seriously tested,” Leggett told The Washington Post.

Leggett, who is seeking his third term as county executive, will face off against his predecessor, Douglas Duncan, and County Councilman Phil Andrews in next June’s Democratic primary.

Andrews has criticized Leggett for a series of tax hikes, including a 2010 increase in the county’s energy tax that increased household electric bills by about $139 annually.

The surcharge and base rate increase approved by the PSC will boost average residential bills by about $26 per year. (See MD OKs $28 Million Base Rate Boost for PEPCO.)

New Rules for Wind Lost Opportunity Costs

Wind farms that fail to follow PJM’s electronic dispatch signals will no longer receive lost opportunity cost payments under a tariff amendment approved by the MRC.

Reason for change: Some wind generators are not following their economic basepoint, requiring PJM to issue manual dispatch instructions. This delays generators’ responses, causing less efficient market operations and a potential risk to system reliability, PJM says.

PJM proposed the new language as a Tariff change in response to a May 29 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission order that rejected its earlier proposal to incorporate the new rules in the Operating Agreement. The commission said the OA language “failed to provide any detail or tariff language describing the specific circumstances under which compensation would be reduced or how the compensation would be reduced.”

Impact: Would add language to section 3.2.3 of Tariff Schedule 1 to deny lost opportunity credits to pool-scheduled or self-scheduled wind generators that fail to follow PJM dispatchers’ electronic instructions to reduce output. (See PJM to Tighten Penalties on Wayward Wind.)

Manual Changes: 1, 12, 19, 20

The Markets and Reliability Committee approved the following manual changes Thursday.

Manual 1: Control Center and Data Exchange Requirements

Reason for change: New rules for access to PJM Energy Management System (EMS).

Impacts:

  • Added new section 2.5.7 detailing rules for transmission owner read-only access to PJM’s EMS. No screen scraping is allowed;
  • Modified section 3.2.3 to clarify procedures for data communication outages;
  • Modified section 4.2.4 to clarify repeating of All Call messages;
  • Adds details to Information Access Matrix in Attachment A.

Manual 12: Balancing Operations

Reason for change: PJM is changing the regulation requirement to align it with operational needs and address volatility in light load periods.

Impacts:

  • Changes On-peak (05:00-23:59) requirement to 700 effective MW, a decrease in the requirement for 52% of days, an increase for 48% of days. Net daily decrease of about 60 MW (section 4.4.3).
  • Changes Off-peak (00:00-04:59) requirement to 525 effective MW, an increase for 66% of days and a decrease for 34% of days. Net daily increase of about 20 MW (section 4.4.3).
  • Changes regulation scoring methods:
    • Performance scoring for small regulation allocation: Historical performance scores will be used if the control signal has an average absolute value less than 1% of the regulation assignment (section 4.5.6);
    • Performance scores when data is not available: Historical performance scores will be used if data is not available and for intervals less than 15 contiguous minutes (adds section 4.5.9);
    • Regulation Assignments: Scoring will be suspended for 10 minutes after assignment to allow time to ramp into position (adds section 4.5.10).

PJM contact: Rus Ogborn

Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis.

Reason for changes: Integration of East Kentucky Power Cooperative (EKPC), addition of annual demand resources and need to ensure accuracy of load shed programs.

Impacts:

  • Adds EKPC to load forecast model;
  • Revises assumption for winter load management;
  • Makes minor typo fixes and clarifications for NERC audits;
  • Changes demand resources available in winter months due to addition of annual DR product;
  • Codifies guidelines for switch operability studies for load management programs. The guidelines are designed to ensure the accuracy of load shed estimates for participants in direct load control programs. The study must be designed for a minimum 90% confidence level and based on a randomly selected sample from the entire population of participating customers. No customers can be excluded.

PJM contact: John Reynolds

Manual 20: PJM Resource Adequacy Analysis

Reason for change: Codifying procedure approved by FERC. The changes were endorsed by the Planning Committee in October 2012.

Impact: Revises section 5 to add Test 2 for the six-hour duration requirement for the Limited DR Product.  The Test 2 procedure is effective with the 2016/17 Delivery Year.

PJM contact: Tom Falin

New Process for Exceptions to Generator Parameters

PJM would add new processes for generators seeking exemptions from operating parameters under changes presented to the Markets and Reliability Committee Thursday.

PJM’s generation parameters set defaults for different types and sizes of generators. The parameters cover minimum run and down times, maximum daily and weekly starts and turn down ratios (Eco Max/Eco Min).

They were initiated in 2008 to ensure lower make whole payments for generators whose entire offers were not covered by Locational Marginal Pricing revenues.

The proposed change, the result of a year-long effort between PJM and the Market Monitor, would create three types of exemptions:

  • Temporary Exception: A one-time exception of 30 days or less.
  • Period Exception: An exception lasting for at least 31 days but no more than one year during the 12 months between June 1 and May 31.
  • Persistent Exception: An exception lasting for at least one year.

MRC will be asked to approve the changes at its next meeting.

Ridge to Headline 20/20 Forum on Grid Resiliency

Former Homeland Security Secretary and Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge will be the keynote speaker at PJM’s Grid 20/20 forum Nov. 11 and 12 in Philadelphia.

The forum, which will take place at the Sheraton Society Hill, will focus on the electric power grid’s ability to withstand extreme weather challenges and cyber attacks.

The forum will cover the ability of the grid to withstand shocks during a physical or cybersecurity event, communication best practices, and the role of policy and investment.

PJM contacts: Erin Sechrist (sechre@pjm.com) and Sarah Burlew (burles@pjm.com).