FERC last week denied a rehearing request but clarified an underlying order addressing MISO’s multi-value transmission projects (MVPs) (ER10-1791).
PJM, American Municipal Power and PJM transmission owners appealed the 2016 ruling, which came in response to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2013 remand of a previous FERC order. The commission’s ensuing order determined that a limitation on MISO’s export pricing to PJM for MVPs was no longer justified, clearing the way for MISO to recover costs for those projects benefiting PJM customers by charging a fee on exports to PJM. (See MISO to Begin Charging Tx Fees on PJM Exports.)
In the order on remand, FERC said that given the growth of wind energy, as well as the need for PJM entities to access the resources and for MISO to deliver those resources to PJM, it was “appropriate to allow MISO to assess the MVP usage charge for transmission service used to export to PJM.”
MISO created the MVP category in 2010 for projects that address more than one reliability or economic need across multiple transmission zones. It originally intended to allocate project costs to all of its load and exports, but FERC excluded the export charge because of concerns over rate pancaking.
The commission rejected claims that it used the same evidence to justify the MVP charges’ application in the order on remand as it did to previously reject them. FERC said it reconsidered its previous determinations on this issue, including, but not limited to, findings made in previous decisions on the rate pancaking issue.
The commission said it centered its original decision on FERC Order 2000’s factors for determining appropriate RTO configuration, but it did not consider how the market-to-market (M2M) process affects those issues. In the order on remand, FERC found that the M2M process allows the RTOs to more efficiently address the inefficiencies and other issues arising along their seam, and noted that the grid operators added many “general improvements to coordination” between them since 2016.
FERC rejected PJM’s request to clarify that MISO must use the RTOs’ joint operating agreement process to review any MVP whose costs would be assessed on exports to PJM through the MVP usage rate, saying it was “based on a false premise.” The MVP usage rate is assessed only to customers voluntarily taking transmission service under the MISO Tariff and does not allocate the cost of every MVP to PJM.
The commission granted PJM’s clarification request regarding potential double recovery of the cost of certain MVPs, saying that when an MVP is selected in both RTOs’ regional transmission plans as an interregional transmission project, only the portion of an MVP’s cost allocated to MISO may be recovered in the MISO MVP usage rate.
FERC last week established a paper hearing to settle a dispute between PJM and an external resource on whether it should be allowed to pseudo-tie into the RTO even if doing so might raise congestion costs for members (EL18-145).
The order gives PJM 45 days to explain how it determined that Tilton Energy’s gas-fired facility failed the RTO’s market-to-market flowgate test, one part of its analysis of units outside of its territory that are attempting to become PJM capacity resources. The 176-MW facility located in Tilton, Ill., has been pseudo-tied into PJM for about two years and has cleared in each of the last two Base Residual Auctions. However, it cleared as part of a transition into stricter pseudo-tie rules that Tilton must pass by May 2019 in order to be eligible to offer into the BRA for the 2022/23 delivery year.
In preparation for that, PJM analyzed the unit’s pseudo-tie and told Tilton in December that it’s not eligible for a pseudo-tie after the 2021/22 delivery year because 44 flowgates failed the RTO’s test. Although none of the flowgates is coordinated, they would all become eligible for coordination between PJM and MISO as a result of the Tilton pseudo-tie.
The test is intended to ensure that PJM assumes responsibility for coordinating a new flowgate to facilitate a pseudo-tie only if at least one internal generation resource also has a 1.5% flow impact on that flowgate, which the RTO considers “appropriate.” The test focuses on internal resources because PJM may use one to alleviate the impact on congestion caused by the external pseudo-tied resource.
Results
PJM found that the pseudo-tie affects 231 flowgates, of which 65 already were coordinated and 166 would newly become eligible for coordination. Of those 166 newly eligible flowgates, 44 did not meet the 1.5% threshold.
PJM is concerned that although MISO has not yet invoked its coordination rights to require PJM to take responsibility for Tilton’s effects on those flowgates, that doesn’t mean it won’t. The RTO says it wants to ensure the pseudo-tie wouldn’t alter its customers’ exposure to coordination costs in the event that MISO does so in the future.
Tilton argues that once a resource’s pseudo-tie passes the test, any subsequent changes to the system should not adversely affect the pseudo-tie, so the potential for flowgates to need to be coordinated in the future shouldn’t affect Tilton’s eligibility. American Municipal Power and Brookfield Energy Marketing filed answers in support of Tilton, agreeing that the test should only apply to flowgates that PJM and MISO have already designated as coordinated.
Brookfield argued that PJM’s interpretation of “each eligible coordinated flowgate” in its Tariff to mean any flowgate is “grammatically nonsensical, as ‘eligible’ clearly does not modify ‘coordinated’ but instead refers to the subgroup of coordinated flowgates.”
Hearing
Instead of hashing out the grammar, FERC set the matter for a paper hearing. The commission ordered PJM to explain four things:
How it determines a flowgate is impacted by a pseudo-tie under the terms of its joint operating agreement with MISO and how it identifies an “eligible coordinated flowgate” resulting from a pseudo-tie from MISO. That includes “a step-by-step description of the process and an explanation of its basis for doing so” and identifying any related processes that might depart from the JOA.
Whether it applies the 5% shift factor threshold in the JOA to determine “eligible coordinated flowgates” or, if not, why it does not, and whether the shift factor threshold, other specific thresholds set forth in the JOA, or some other screen would be a reasonable means of identifying flowgates for which coordination could be required.
How the flowgate test was applied to Tilton’s pseudo-tie, including an explanation of how PJM identified the “eligible coordinated flowgates” associated with the pseudo-tie and how PJM implemented each step of the test.
Whether PJM intends to request, or whether PJM expects MISO to request, coordination for any of the “eligible coordinated flowgates” identified for Tilton, and why or why not.
Tilton will then have 30 days to respond with testimony or evidence. The commission set the refund date for May 11, 2018, when Tilton filed the complaint.
Below is a summary of the issues scheduled to be brought to a vote at the PJM Markets and Reliability and Members committees on Thursday. Each item is listed by agenda number, description and projected time of discussion, followed by a summary of the issue and links to prior coverage in RTO Insider.
RTO Insiderwill be in Valley Forge, Pa., covering the discussions and votes. See next Tuesday’s newsletter for a full report.
Markets and Reliability Committee
Consent Agenda (9:15-9:20)
Members will be asked to endorse:
B. Tariff and Operating Agreement revisions developed by the Governing Documents Enhancement & Clarification Subcommittee (GDECS).
1. PJM Manuals (9:20-9:35)
Members will be asked to endorse the following proposed manual changes:
A. Manual 1: Control Center and Data Exchange Requirements. Revisions developed to change system operator communication protocols while controlling facility constraints and data specification and collection requirements during outages.
Members will be asked to endorse a proposal and associated manual revisions developed by the Distributed Energy Resources Subcommittee that would give PJM and transmission owners better observability of behind-the-meter generation resources. (See “BTM Visibility,” PJM MRC/MC Briefs: Aug. 23, 2018.)
3. Market Seller Offer Cap Balancing Ratio Proposal (9:50-10:05)
Members will be asked to endorse a proposal approved by the Market Implementation Committee that would change how PJM estimates the expected future balancing ratio used in the default market seller offer cap. The proposed method would take the average balancing ratios during the three delivery years that immediately precede the Base Residual Auction using actual balancing ratios calculated during RTO performance assessment intervals (PAIs) of the delivery years, along with estimated balancing ratios calculated during the intervals of the highest RTO peak loads that do not overlap a PAI for any preceding delivery year with less than 360 intervals (30 hours) of RTO PAIs. (See “Balancing Ratio,” PJM Market Implementation Committee Briefs: July 11, 2018.)
4. Variable Operations and Maintenance (10:05-10:25)
Members will be asked to endorse a proposal documented in draft revisions to Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines, the OA and Tariff. The proposal has been revised from what the MRC voted on previously to remove inclusion of fixed costs for energy resources and units that did not clear the capacity auction, and to include the variable operations and maintenance language in the OA and Tariff, meaning that the revisions would only be implemented with FERC approval. (See PJM Ponders Advancing VOM Effort over Objections.)
5. Quadrennial Review (10:25-10:45)
Members will be asked to endorse one of several proposed packages to revise PJM’s variable resource requirement demand curve as part of its quadrennial review. Among them are the RTO’s recommendations and a proposal from the D.C. Office of the People’s Counsel. (See “Concessions of VRR Curve Recommendations,” PJM Market Implementation Committee Briefs: Sept. 12, 2018.)
Members will be asked to endorse on first read one of six proposals and the status quo regarding alternative financial transmission rights default liquidation provisions and associated revisions to governing documents. If no proposal is endorsed, Citigroup Energy’s Barry Trayers is expected to move, and EDP Renewables’ John Brodbeck expected to second, a motion to extend the pending FERC filing to not offer the defaulted FTR positions for liquidation for an additional 90 days. (See GreenHat FTR Default a ‘Pig’s Ear’ for PJM Members.)
Members Committee
Consent Agenda (1:20-1:25)
Members will be asked to endorse:
B. Open Access Transmission Tariff and Reliability Assurance Agreement revisions associated with the registration process for aggregated seasonal demand response resources. (See “Seasonal Aggregation,” PJM MRC/MC Briefs: July 26, 2018.)
1. FTR Liquidation Process (1:25-1:45)
Members will be asked to endorse proposed OA and Tariff revisions associated with FTR default liquidation. If no proposal in agenda item 1.A is endorsed, then members will be asked to approve a motion to extend the pending FERC filing to not offer the defaulted FTR positions for liquidation for an additional 90 days. (See MRC item 6 above.)
2. Market Efficiency Process Enhancement Proposal (1:45-2:00)
Members will be asked to approve phase 1 of a proposal developed at the Market Efficiency Process Enhancement Task Force and associated OA revisions. (See “Market Efficiency,” PJM MRC/MC Briefs: Aug. 23, 2018.)
4. Variable Operations and Maintenance (2:30-2:45)
Members will be asked to endorse/approve proposed revisions to Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines, the OA and Tariff regarding VOM. (See MRC item 4 above.)
5. Quadrennial Review (2:45-3:00)
Members will be asked to endorse proposed Tariff revisions associated with the quadrennial review of Reliability Pricing Model parameters. (See MRC item 5 above.)
6. Liaison Committee Charter (3:00-3:30)
Members will be asked to approve a motion to grant exceptions to the Liaison Committee charter addressing attendance at the Oct. 3, 2018, LC meeting with the Board of Managers. The exception brought by Greg Poulos, Consumer Advocates of the PJM States (CAPS) executive director, would allow RTO management and staff, state commission representatives, the Independent Market Monitor and FERC staff to attend the meetings.
Gov. Jerry Brown on Friday signed a legislative plan to help California utilities deal with the massive costs of wildfires sparked by power lines. But that measure’s proposal to let utilities sell bonds to pay for fires may not be an adequate solution to the bigger and more destructive blazes that appear to be the state’s new normal, some skeptics contend.
Going forward, California may need to establish a catastrophic wildfire fund or similar program to keep utilities solvent while quickly compensating wildfire victims, they said.
“The concept of having a pool of money on the front end that allows for rapid recovery is important,” said Jan Smutny-Jones, CEO of the Independent Energy Producers Association and former chairman of CAISO’s Board of Governors. “We need something more forward looking, a better approach.”
One proposal that failed to make it into the bill was a plan to establish state-regulated investment accounts that utilities could use to cover future wildfire costs, said Barry Moline, executive director of the California Municipal Utilities Association.
“We proposed not so much an insurance fund as a savings account,” Moline said. “The idea was to create this fund that utilities would pay into a little at a time,” with tax breaks as incentives, he said.
The plan proved too complicated to deal with in a limited time frame, but it could come up again next year, he said.
“It was a lot to wrap everybody’s head around in a short amount of time,” Moline said. “We took a month to work it out, and then there were only two weeks left of session.”
Another proposal was to create a program similar to the one Florida established for hurricane relief.
“We should be thinking about solutions like the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, which uses a modest surcharge on insurance policies to cover catastrophic losses,” Tom Long, litigation director for The Utility Reform Network, told lawmakers at an Aug. 9 hearing on SB 901.
That idea gained little traction because it essentially would have required those with sufficient homeowners insurance to subsidize those who are uninsured or under-insured, Moline said.
‘Big Uncertainty’
Lawmakers passed SB 901 shortly before concluding their two-year session at the end of August. It included some elements of a proposal Brown sent to the State Legislature in July.
Most of the proposals discussed prior to the bill’s passage had two goals: to compensate fire victims and to reduce the costs of holding utilities strictly liable for fire damages.
California extensively uses a legal procedure called “inverse condemnation” to make utilities pay for wildfires caused by electrical equipment, whether or not the utilities were negligent. Because the utilities can use eminent domain to take private property, the thinking goes, they should be liable for all damages to private property.
The result is that utilities often pay damages to fire victims without a long court battle over fault.
Inverse condemnation exists in almost every state, but California has used it far more broadly than any other jurisdiction.
That worked fine for decades, but recent fires have been cataclysmic, perhaps because of climate change. A series of blazes in Northern California’s wine country in October 2017, for example, could cost Pacific Gas and Electric more than $15 billion, according to some estimates.
As a result, PG&E’s stock has struggled in recent months and its financial solvency has been called into question.
“The possibility of that liability [for the 2017 fires] destabilized the utilities, lowering their bond ratings, which increased the cost of financing, which is ultimately borne by ratepayers since it increases the costs of the utilities,” said Kellie Smith, chief consultant to the conference committee that drafted SB 901.
Brown’s July proposal would have done away with inverse condemnation and strict liability. Utilities only would have had to pay for fires they’d caused through negligence.
The governor’s proposal was widely criticized by insurers, plaintiffs’ attorneys and ratepayer advocates, some of whom called it a bailout of PG&E.
A bipartisan panel of State Senators and Assembly members did not deal with inverse condemnation in the final version of SB 901. Instead, they drafted a plan that would allow the utilities to sell bonds to cover wildfire costs. The bond debts would slowly be repaid by additional charges on customers’ electric bills.
That didn’t make the utilities particularly happy, nor did it appease ratepayer advocates.
PG&E responded to a request for comment for this story by reiterating its general support for the bill but leaving open the possibility of future legislative action.
“While the legislation addresses many urgent needs, we must continue to work together to ensure ongoing investment in climate resiliency and clean energy, and to combat the devastating threat that extreme weather and climate change pose to our state’s shared energy future,” the company said in a written statement.
IEPA’s Smutny-Jones said it’s always been assumed that utilities could recover wildfire costs from ratepayers through incremental increases in electric bills. The magnitude of recent wildfires, however, calls that assumption into question, he said.
“That’s the big uncertainty,” he said.
If the state’s investor-owned utilities are destabilized, it could threaten California’s ambitious goals of largely relying on renewable energy sources, such as the wind- and solar-power generators that he represents, Smutny-Jones said.
It’s likely that how the state pays for wildfires will be an ongoing topic in Sacramento, he said.
“I think the Legislature will continue to be engaged on this issue,” he said. “Coming up with some sort of catastrophic wildfire fund or another insurance mechanism, we will continue to see activity in that area.”
FERC on Thursday confirmed its denial of requests to change two merchant transmission facilities’ interconnection agreements, rejecting requests to rehear the orders (ER17-2073, ER17-2267).
But the commission’s procedural rulings were moot because it granted Hudson Transmission Partners and Linden VFT the substantive relief they sought nearly a year ago.
Hudson and Linden had sought to amend their facilities’ interconnection service agreements (ISAs) to downgrade their combined 1,003 MW of firm transmission withdrawal rights, which include the right to schedule energy and capacity withdrawals from the PJM system, into non-firm transmission withdrawal rights that only include the right to schedule energy.
Citing transmission owner Public Service Electric and Gas’ opposition to the changes, FERC rejected them, saying PJM’s Tariff doesn’t allow it to alter agreements without approval of all the signatories. But the commission also initiated a Section 206 investigation of the Tariff language that required it to deny the requests. (See Rejecting PJM ‘Wheel’-related Requests, FERC Sets Inquiry.)
That investigation led the commission to rule last December that the Tariff language was unjust and unreasonable and that the facilities should have the ability to unilaterally change from firm to non-firm rights. (See NJ Merchant Tx Operators Win Relief on Upgrade Costs.)
In the interim, Linden and Hudson had filed for rehearing. In Thursday’s ruling, FERC stuck with its original reasoning rejecting arguments that the revisions were “a nonsubstantive change … akin to other ministerial amendments PJM regularly files unexecuted.”
There was no doubt that the switch to non-firm service was substantive, as they determined whether Hudson and Linden would be on the hook for the roughly $653 million in costs PJM allocated to them for upgrades to PSE&G’s transmission system.
FERC on Thursday rejected a request by the New England States Committee on Electricity to broaden the commission’s February ruling raising ISO-NE’s peak energy rent (PER) adjustment. The commission also approved the RTO’s compliance filing in the matter (EL16-120, ER17-2153, ER18-1153).
The commission had approved an uncontested settlement that resolved issues it set for hearing in 2017 after finding that the PER mechanism had become unjust and unreasonable because of the interaction between the mechanism and higher reserve constraint penalty factors (RCPF). The settlement covered the period of Sept. 30, 2016 — the date of the initiating complaint by the New England Power Generators Association — through May 31, 2018, the last day of the capacity commitment period for Forward Capacity Auction 8. (See FERC OKs Settlement on ISO-NE Scarcity Rules.)
The Feb. 20 order noted the settling parties did not agree on the application of the revised strike price methodology to FCA 9, the capacity commitment period beginning June 1, 2018.
NESCOE supported the adjusted PER strike price but protested continued use of the methodology after May 31. It asked FERC to require ISO-NE to reinstate, effective June 1, 2018, the method it used to calculate the PER strike price before the settlement period.
NESCOE said the settlement order did not address the circumstances when a PER event occurs prior to May 31, 2018. But because of the 12-month rolling average used in the PER calculation, such an event would affect ISO-NE’s calculation of the PER credit against the monthly payment that load must make to capacity resources after that date, NESCOE said.
The organization said the new methodology should not apply for FCA 9 because the auction was held in February 2015 — after the RCPFs were increased, which allowed resources to reflect the change in their supply offers.
NEPGA countered that NESCOE’s position “would deny capacity suppliers the full extent of the relief granted by the commission.”
The commission said NESCOE’s request would require Tariff changes under Federal Power Act Section 205 or 206 and was beyond the scope of the proceeding.
“NESCOE’s request would, in effect, mean that the PER payments to load (i.e., the credit against the monthly payment that load must make to capacity resources that is associated with PER events) starting on June 1, 2018, would be calculated as if each monthly PER amount for the 12-month averaging process were calculated using the original PER strike price for the Sept. 30, 2016, to May 31, 2018 period.”
FERC previously agreed to eliminate the PER adjustment effective with the capacity commitment period beginning June 1, 2019 (ER17-2153, EL16-120). ISO-NE said its Pay-for-Performance program and changes to the day-ahead energy market made the adjustment unnecessary beyond that date.
FCA 8 Challenge Rejected
In another ISO-NE ruling, FERC rejected as untimely a 2015 protest by the Utility Workers Union of America Local 464 (UWUA) over the results of FCA 8, which the union claimed was tainted by Energy Capital Partners’ decision to close its Brayton Point generating plant.
In September 2014, the commission split 2-2 over whether it should reject the results from FCA 8 because of unchecked market power, allowing the 2017/18 auction results to become “effective by operation of law” (ER14-1409).
UWUA’s protest said the commission should have revisited the issue after it added a fifth commissioner able to break the 2-2 deadlock.
But the commission said protests were required to be filed by April 14, 2014, and that when the union filed its protest, FCA 8 was no longer pending.
FERC noted that it had rejected UWUA’s similar challenges to the results of FCA 9 and 10 after a nonpublic investigation that “found credible justifications for the owners’ retirement decision.” It also noted that its rulings were upheld on appeal in July. (See D.C. Circuit Dismisses Union Challenges to FCA Results.)
In a stunning turnaround, FERC’s Office of Enforcement on Wednesday urged the commission to withdraw its Order to Show Cause alleging that the operators of the Salem Harbor Power Station misled ISO-NE with supply offers it could not meet because of insufficient fuel.
Enforcement litigation staff made the unusual recommendation based on Footprint Power’s Aug. 2 response to the order, which argued that Enforcement had overstated what ISO-NE expected from Salem Harbor Unit 4. (See Salem Harbor Operator Seeks Dismissal of ‘False Offer’ Case.)
The Office of Enforcement’s June 18 show cause order said Footprint Power should forfeit more than $2 million in capacity payments Unit 4 received for a period in June and July 2013 during which the plant’s fuel supply prevented it from operating at its offered capacity. It also sought $4.2 million in civil penalties.
But in its new filing, staff said it was persuaded by new arguments that the commission had failed to consider the 17.5 hours that it took Salem Unit 4 to reach full output from a cold start (IN18-7).
“Although staff disagrees with most of the arguments that Footprint raises, staff finds merit in Footprint’s new defense relating to the start-up requirements of [Unit 4]. In consideration of that argument — one which Footprint had not fully raised … staff agrees with Footprint that its conduct during the June 27 through July 17, 2013, portion of the relevant period (i.e., June and July 2013) does not violate the four Tariff provisions and regulations at issue here.
“Staff still believes that Footprint violated those four Tariff provisions and regulations during the remaining portion of the relevant period, when Footprint submitted day-ahead limited energy generator (LEG) offers from July 18 to July 25, because the start-up requirements comprising Footprint’s new defense do not apply then.”
Enforcement recommended the commission vacate the Order to Show Cause and not assess a penalty or further pursue the matter because the reduced scope of the violations lessened the impact on the market.
“The extent of harm that resulted from Footprint’s conduct is uncertain but likely limited. Moreover, Unit 4 was retired in 2014 and has since been demolished. It is being replaced by a new modern gas plant. Consequently, this specific conduct (i.e., misrepresentations about how much fuel is in the tank) will not recur. For all of these reasons, staff does not believe that pursuing the case further is a prudent use of the staff’s resources.”
Footprint’s lead attorney, John N. Estes III of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, said his client was “gratified” by FERC’s change of heart.
“We trust that the commission will act promptly to follow Enforcement staff’s recommendation and finally end this groundless and stale set of allegations,” he said.
FERC on Thursday established hearing and settlement procedures for a Louisiana Public Service Commission complaint against two Entergy subsidiaries (EL18-152).
The PSC alleged in a Section 206 complaint filed in May that System Energy Resources Inc. (SERI) and Entergy Services violated the filed-rate doctrine and FERC’s ratemaking and accounting requirements by billing ratepayers for the costs of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station’s sale-leaseback renewals under a unit-power sales agreement between SERI and Entergy’s Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and New Orleans operating companies.
FERC found the PSC’s complaint “raises issues of material fact that cannot be resolved based upon the record before us” and would be more appropriately addressed in settlement procedures. The commission set a refund date of May 18, 2018.
Louisiana’s regulators requested the hearing and asked that unjust and unreasonable costs be removed from billings.
The PSC’s complaint stemmed from SERI’s renewal of two sale-leaseback agreements in 2015 that dated back to 1988. The regulators said SERI originally sold to private-equity investors an 11.5% interest in Grand Gulf for $500 million and leased it back for 26.5 years. They said the original cost of the lease was $435 million with a net book value of $398 million, claiming SERI included the costs in its formula rate as rents for ratemaking purposes.
The PSC said SERI paid off the $500 million principal balance over the leaseback terms, which ended July 15, 2015, but ratepayers paid all of the costs except for an $11 million net-of-tax gain credited in rates pursuant to a 1991 settlement. SERI recovered $489 million plus interest paid to the lessor through its formula rate expense, more than the $398 million book value, the regulators said.
The PSC further argued that SERI double recovered the sale-leaseback costs by making capital additions to the 11.5% interest and separately charged ratepayers a return. SERI’s fair market value lease renewal cost of $17.2 million/year, which SERI has included in rates as rents since 1995, “constitutes double collection of the capital addition costs,” the PSC said. It asked FERC to exclude the lease payments from rates and to order refunds from the time of the sale-leaseback renewal or order another ratemaking adjustment.
The Louisiana regulators also asked the commission to investigate and ensure that consumers receive the entire benefit of a litigation payment SERI received for the Department of Energy’s failure to dispose of Grand Gulf’s spent nuclear fuel.
SERI, a wholly owned subsidiary of New Orleans-based Entergy, generates and sells nuclear power, primarily through its 90% ownership and leasehold interest in Grand Gulf. Entergy Services is a service subsidiary that provides accounting, legal, regulatory and other services to Entergy’s operating companies.
WASHINGTON — FERC Chairman Kevin McIntyre was absent from the commission’s monthly open meeting Thursday, citing his recovery following surgery for a brain tumor and a fall.
Commissioner Neil Chatterjee, who chaired the meeting, opened by reading a statement in which McIntyre apologized for his absence.
“I had fully intended to be present. However, my ongoing recovery prevents me from being here in person today,” McIntyre said.
“While my health situation has impacted my mobility, it has not impacted my ability to get the commission’s work done,” he added, citing 151 orders since the July open meeting, an agreement with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration over LNG terminal permitting and the appointment of Administrative Law Judge Stephanie Nagel.
McIntyre also expressed gratitude “for everyone’s concern regarding my ongoing recovery.”
Chatterjee ended McIntyre’s statement with his own comment, saying “I know I speak for my fellow commissioners when I say that we wish the chairman the best in his continued recovery.”
McIntyre revealed in March that he had had surgery for a brain tumor and was undergoing treatment. Shortly before July’s meeting, the chairman disclosed that he had compression fractures in two of his vertebrae, causing severe back pain, and that he had fallen and injured his arm on July 4.
At the July 19 open meeting, McIntyre remained seated throughout, and it was apparent that he was in pain. (See “McIntyre Toughs it out,” FERC Says Farewell to Powelson.) The commission does not meet in August.
McIntyre also was absent at the commission’s annual reliability technical conference July 31.
On Sept. 11, FERC posted an episode of its “Open Access” podcast, in which McIntyre said he was “well on the mend, and I’m feeling better every day.”
“I also am happy to report that I have continued to work full steam ahead with my colleagues, my personal staff and the commission’s professional staff to ensure that the commission’s work continues unabated. In fact, the August break wasn’t much of a break.”
However, sources have told RTO Insider that the chairman is often absent from FERC headquarters and that meetings with him have been frequently rescheduled as a result.
When asked how often McIntyre has been coming into headquarters for work, FERC spokeswoman Mary O’Driscoll said Thursday, “I can’t answer that; I don’t know.” She was incredulous when asked whether the chairman had considered resigning because of his health issues. “What? Where is that coming from? No. I don’t know. No.”
Another spokesman, Craig Cano, declined to comment.
In another departure from normal proceedings, the commission did not hold a press conference after the meeting. Despite being repeatedly asked, O’Driscoll refused to give reporters a reason for this.
“From time to time we do not have briefings. So it’s not breaking with tradition. I’ve been here 11 years, and I’ve done it at least once with each chairman I’ve served. … I don’t know why you’re making a big deal about this. No briefing. OK?”
FERC and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration on Thursday celebrated their agreement to coordinate the siting and safety reviews of LNG export facilities, saying their Aug. 31 memorandum of understanding will speed the process and make it easier for applicants.
FERC has authority under the Natural Gas Act for authorizing LNG terminals while the Department of Transportation’s PHMSA is responsible for establishing minimal safety standards under the Pipeline Safety Act of 1979.
In the past, FERC staff made preliminary determinations on whether a proposed LNG project could comply with DOT standards, FERC General Counsel James Danly said during a briefing at Thursday’s open commission meeting. But he said the process became problematic with the growing number of applications for LNG export terminals, which are more complex than import facilities.
“This required an extremely iterative process with multiple requests for information from the applicants and back and forth with PHMSA. The MOU that we’ve just signed is going to end that duplicative and iterative process, and now … the experts on this subject — PHMSA — are going to be the ones who make that preliminary determination,” Danly said.
The agreement should allow FERC to accelerate its review on a dozen pending applications, Danly said, “potentially allowing FERC to act by early 2020 on projects capable of exporting over 8 Tcf per year.”
“The numbers involved in the LNG industry are astounding,” said PHMSA Administrator Howard Elliott, who also appeared at the meeting. “A single export facility can deliver an economic impact of $10 billion or more per year, and strong demand from the Asia-Pacific region looks to likely drive those numbers higher over time.”
Commissioner Neil Chatterjee praised the agreement but said FERC should do more, suggesting the commission consider adding a regional office in Houston and boost salaries to make them competitive with industry “to improve retention and recruiting of top-tier engineers and attorneys.”
The U.S., which last year became a net exporter of natural gas, is shipping gas to more than 25 countries, largely through its two operating LNG export terminals, Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass in Louisiana and Dominion Energy’s Cove Point in Maryland. The Department of Energy is considering about 25 applications for LNG exports to countries lacking free-trade agreements with the U.S.
“If the U.S. can ensure that adequate LNG export infrastructure is in place to meet that demand, it could mean thousands of additional jobs across the U.S.,” Chatterjee said. “But if we miss the window of opportunity because of bottlenecks in FERC’s LNG export facility application review process or because FERC lacks the resources to complete its review process in a timely fashion, those foreign trading partners will be looking elsewhere for their natural gas.”
Although there is a consensus that exporting too much domestic natural gas could expose U.S. consumers, industrial users and electric generators to much higher world prices, there is no agreement on what that tipping point is, or how soon the U.S. could get there. (See Enviros, Industrials Challenge DOE Study on LNG Exports.)